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We study the notion of strong equivalence between two disjunctive logic programs under
the G ′3-stable model semantics, also called the p-stable semantics, and we show how
some particular cases of testing strong equivalence between programs can be reduced to
checking whether a formula is a theorem in some paraconsistent logic, or in some cases
in classical logic. We also present some program transformations for disjunctive programs
which can be used to reduce the size of a program.
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1. Introduction
The research community has long recognized the study of non-monotonic reasoning (NMR) as a promising approach
to model features of commonsense reasoning. On the other hand, monotonic logics have been successfully applied as a
basic building block in the formalization of non-monotonic reasoning. In this direction, Veloso and Carnielli [39] provide a
precise treatment of notions such as ‘generally’, ‘rarely’, ‘most’, ‘many’, etc. in terms of logics of qualitative reasoning. These
(monotonic) generalized logics, with simple sound and complete deductive calculi, are proper conservative extensions of
classical ﬁrst-order logic. Another line of research considers non-classical logics based on some form of logical completions.
This paper explores some properties of one of the semantics based on this second formalization. We point out that this is a
non-typical application of paraconsistency that deserves to be studied.
The stable semantics, which has been successfully used in the modeling of non-monotonic reasoning, was introduced
by Gelfond and Lifschitz [16] by means of a simple transformation. More recently, a new semantics useful to model non-
monotonic reasoning has been developed: the p-stable semantics. The original ideas that motivated this semantics can be
found in [23]. Several works on the p-stable semantics have been done, some of the more relevant are [25,26,22,21,7,40,30].
In [26] the authors deﬁne the p-stable semantics for normal programs in terms of the G ′3 logic and a construct called
weak completion.
In [22] the authors generalize to disjunctive programs what was done in [26]. They introduce the p-stable semantics
for disjunctive programs by means of a transformation similar to the one used by Gelfond and Lifschitz [16]. Thus, the p-
stable semantics for normal and disjunctive programs can be expressed in two ways: in terms of a ﬁxed point operator and
classical logic after applying such transformation, and also in terms of the G ′3 logic and weak completions. For this reason
we refer to this semantics with either of the two names: p-stable or G ′3-semantics.
We emphasize that the p-stable semantics presented here, is a two-valued semantics that can be characterized by the
three-valued logic G ′3. This semantics should not be confused with the partial stable semantics deﬁned by Przymusinski [34].
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lence in this semantics. Two programs P1 and P2 are said to be strongly G ′3-stable equivalent, if for every program P , the
programs P1 ∪ P and P2 ∪ P are G ′3-stable equivalent, i.e. they have the same G ′3-stable models. The notion of strongly
equivalent logic programs is interesting since, given two sets of rules that are strongly equivalent, one of them can be re-
placed by the other in any logic program without changing its declarative semantics. This replacement can be a step towards
program simpliﬁcation. The notion of equivalence between logic programs has been studied by several authors in the con-
text of the stable semantics, for example [11,18,24]. In the present work a different kind of equivalence is considered along
with strong G ′3-stable equivalence for disjunctive programs, it is called uniform G ′3-stable equivalence and is weaker than
strong G ′3-stable equivalence. The concept of uniform equivalence has been presented for the traditional stable semantics in
[13,32,36].
We present two main results that guarantee G ′3 strong equivalence, one for two arbitrary programs and another one for
a couple of programs of the form P , P ∪ {a ←}, where P is a disjunctive program and a is an atom. A similar result for
disjunctive programs in the context of the stable semantics is presented in Lemma 4.2 of [24], but in that case the necessary
condition for the strong equivalence of P and P ∪ {a ←} is more stringent. Both of our results depend on verifying that a
certain formula is a theorem in some particular logic. Finally, we present some program transformations that help to reduce
the size of a program. In most cases the transformed program is strongly G ′3-equivalent to the original program.
This paper is a revised and extended version of [8]. It also extends the work presented by Pascucci and Fernandez [30]
in many ways. We consider new transformation rules, as well as disjunctive programs rather than normal ones. We include
results related to strong and uniform equivalence.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 tells about the foundations of the G ′3-stable semantics and some of
its applications. Section 3 starts with basic background and deﬁnitions of the G ′3-logic, the p-stable semantics and the X-
stable semantics for any logic X . Section 4 presents the main results relative to strong equivalence for disjunctive programs.
Finally, Section 5 deals with some basic transformations of programs. Then, we present our conclusions and ideas for future
work.
2. Motivation and logical foundations of the G ′3-stable semantics
2.1. Origins and foundations
Recently, in [22] an approach for knowledge representation was proposed in terms of any paraconsistent logic stronger
than or equal to Cω , the weakest paraconsistent logic introduced by da Costa [10]. The authors of [21] present a deep study
of the paraconsistent logic G ′3 which is a 3-valued logic. The matrices that deﬁne the logic G ′3 were originally introduced
by Carnielli and Marcos [9] only to prove that a certain formula is not a theorem in Cw . In fact, the set of theorems of G ′3
is a superset of the set of theorems of Cw .
One interesting feature of the G ′3-logic presented in [21], is that it can be expressed in terms of the Łukasiewicz L3-
logic, and vice-versa, the Łukasiewicz L3-logic can be expressed in terms of the G ′3-logic. In particular, G ′3 can deﬁne the
same class of functions as Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic and also can express very directly the strongest intermediate logic
(also known as the Gödel’s 3-valued logic) G3. In the same survey, the authors also prove that the logic G ′3 admits a ﬁnite
axiomatization, in fact, the one presented there consists of the axioms for Cw plus four new axioms.
The authors of [26] introduce the p-stable semantics for normal programs, they also introduce the X-stable semantics
for arbitrary programs and for any logic X . The construction used in this deﬁnition is called weak completion. The authors
present several paraconsistent logics, all of them between Cw , the weakest paraconsistent logic, and Pac, a well known
maximal paraconsistent logic studied by Avron [1], and prove that the weak completions of all of these logics are equivalent
to each other for normal programs. In [22] the authors establish this last result for disjunctive programs.
Weak completions have been used by D. Pearce [31] to characterize the stable semantics of disjunctive programs. Pearce’s
result states that weak completions of intermediate constructive logics (in particular G3 logic and intuitionism) deﬁne the
stable semantics of disjunctive programs.
In a parallel way, the p-stable semantics of disjunctive programs can be deﬁned in terms of weak completions of para-
consistent logics, in particular G ′3 [25,26]. It can also be expressed in terms of modal logics [25], and it can express the
stable semantics of disjunctive programs [22].
We can say then, that two major classes of logics are successfully used to model NMR: constructive intermediate logics
and paraconsistent logics. A well known semantics for modeling NMR is the stable semantics, which can be deﬁned in terms
of Intermediate logics. This semantics provides a fairly general framework for representing incomplete information and for
reasoning with it. The p-stable semantics, which can be deﬁned in terms of paraconsistent logics, shares several properties
with the stable semantics, but is closer to classical logic.
2.2. Major known results
[22] offers several results about the relation between the stable and the p-stable semantics, in particular every stable
model of a normal program is also a p-stable model, but the converse is not true as shown by the program a ← ¬a, which
has {a} as its unique p-stable model and does not have stable models. The authors also give a suﬃcient condition on
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namely: a disjunctive program P is closed under D-shifts if for any of its disjunctive rules: H ← B+,¬B− , and any a ∈ H,
the rule a ← B+,¬{B ∪ H − {a}}− also belongs to P . Then we have that any stable model of a disjunctive program closed
under D-shifts is also a p-stable model of the program.
One of the main results presented in [22], is the fact that the G ′3-stable semantics is powerful enough to express the well
known stable semantics of disjunctive programs; more precisely, the authors present a translation of a disjunctive program
D into a normal program N, such that the p-stable model semantics of N corresponds to the stable semantics of D when
restricted to the common language of the theories.
The G ′3-stable semantics shares properties with the stable semantics, but is closer to the semantics deﬁned by classical
logic. Consider the normal program P1: {a ← ¬b}.
The well known stable semantics by Gelfond and Lifschitz [16] of P1, as well as the G ′3-stable semantics give {a} as the
unique intended model of this program. If we use classical logic we obtain {b} as a second model, but this is against the
spirit of logic programming.
Now, let us consider the following program P2: {a ← ¬b,a ← b,b ← a}.
P2 does not have stable models, but the set {a,b} is a model of P in classical logic. Indeed, this set is also the only
G ′3-stable model of P2.
The main purpose of argumentation theory (Dung [12]), is to study the fundamental mechanism humans use in argu-
mentation, and to explore ways to implement this mechanism on computers. Recently, in [7,27] it was shown that given
an argumentation framework, its preferred semantics1 can be characterized by means of a normal program, such that the
preferred extensions of the argumentation framework correspond exactly to the G ′3-stable models of the normal program.
The three major semantics of argumentation theory (grounded, stable, and preferred) can be characterized in terms of three
logic programming semantics: the well founded semantics (van Gelder et al. [38]), the stable semantics (Gelfond and Lifs-
chitz [16]), and the p-stable semantics, respectively, in terms of a unique normal logic program PAF , which is constructed
only in terms of the argumentation framework AF . PAF does not depend on any particular semantics. If we want to obtain
the stable semantics of AF , we compute the stable semantics of logic programming over PAF . If, on the other hand, we want
to obtain the preferred semantics of AF , we compute the p-stable semantics over PAF . Moreover, if we want to obtain the
grounded semantics of AF , we compute the well founded semantics over PAF .
These results help to understand the close relationship between two successful approaches to non-monotonic reasoning:
argumentation theory and logic programming with negation as failure.
2.3. Extensions
In order to ﬁnish this brief motivation, we consider the expressivity of p-stable semantics. We mention three different
approaches for knowledge representation based on this semantics: updates, preferences and argumentation (see previous
section).
In case intelligent agents get new knowledge and this knowledge must be used to update the knowledge base, it is
important to avoid inconsistencies. An update semantics for update sequences of programs based on G ′3-stable semantics is
proposed in [28].
The concept of preferences is considered a vital component of reasoning with real-world knowledge. In [29], the authors
introduce preference rules which allow to specify preferences as an ordering among the possible solutions to a problem.
Their approach allows us to express preferences for arbitrary programs. They also deﬁne a semantics for those programs.
The formalism used to develop their work is the G ′3-stable semantics.
Finally, we mention that the theory of the p-stable semantics is closely related to topics that have been active areas of
research: The theory of paraconsistent logics, the theory of ground non-monotonic modal logics, and the theory of weak
completions created by D. Pearce to characterize the stable semantics of disjunctive programs in terms of constructive
intermediate logics.
Thus, the G ′3-stable semantics is one of several semantics deﬁned by a family of paraconsistent logics, all of which deﬁne
the p-stable semantics when restricted to disjunctive programs.
3. Background
A signature L is a ﬁnite set of elements that we call atoms, or propositional symbols. The language of a propositional logic
has an alphabet consisting of
proposition symbols: p0, p1, . . . ,
connectives: ∧, ∨, ←, ¬,
auxiliary symbols: (,),
1 It is worth mentioning that the preferred semantics is one of the most accepted argumentation semantics in argumentation theory. Bench-Capon and
Dunne [3].
J.L. Carballido et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 8 (2010) 82–96 85Table 1
Truth tables of connectives ¬ and → in G ′3.
x ¬x
0 2
1 2
2 0
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 1 2
where ∧, ∨, ← are 2-place connectives and ¬ is a 1-place connective. Formulas are built up as usual in logic. If F is a
formula we will refer to its signature LF as the set of atoms that occur in F . The formula F ≡ G is an abbreviation for
(F ← G) ∧ (G ← F ). The formula A ← B is just another way of writing B → A. A literal is either an atom a, or the negation
of an atom ¬a.
When a formula is constructed as a conjunction (or disjunction) of a set of literals , F =∧ (or F =∨), we denote
by Lit(F ) such set of literals. A clause is a formula of the form H ← B (also written as B → H), where H and B , arbitrary
formulas in principle, are known as the head and body of the clause respectively. The body of a clause could be empty, in
which case the clause is known as a fact and can be noted just by: H ←. In the case when the head of a clause is empty,
the clause is called a constraint and is noted by: ← B .
A normal clause is a clause of the form a ←∧(B+ ∪ ¬B−) where a is an atom, and B+ , B− are, possibly empty, sets
of atoms. A disjunctive clause is a clause of the form
∨H ←∧(B+ ∪ ¬B−) where H is a set of atoms, and B+ , B− are,
possibly empty, sets of atoms.
The symbol ¬, before one of such sets, denotes the conjunction of the negations of the atoms belonging to the set.
Sometimes a disjunctive clause may be written as H ← B+,¬B− following typical conventions for logic programs, similarly
for normal clauses. A deﬁnite program is a normal program whose rules do not have negations in their bodies.
Finally, a program is a ﬁnite set of clauses. If all the clauses in a program are of a certain type, we say that the program
is also of that type. For instance a set of disjunctive clauses is a disjunctive program, a set of normal clauses is a normal
program and so on.
For arbitrary programs, and proper subclasses, we will use HEAD(P ) to denote the set of all atoms occurring in the heads
of the clauses of P .
Next, we proceed to give deﬁnitions of the relevant logics and semantics.
3.1. The G ′3 , Cw and I logics
This paper deals mainly with the G ′3 logic, however some of the results we mention later are related to other logics; we
present here some basic background about these logics.
The G ′3 logic is a 3-valued logic with truth values in the domain D = {0,1,2} where 2 is the designated value. The
evaluation functions of the logic connectives are then deﬁned as follows: x ∧ y = min(x, y); x ∨ y = max(x, y); the ¬ and
→ connectives are deﬁned according to the truth tables given in Table 1.
We deﬁne a tautology as any formula that takes only the designated value 2, regardless of what the truth values the
atoms in the formula may take. We will use the notation |G ′3 A, to express the fact that A is a tautology in G ′3.
We must notice the subtle difference between the logic G ′3 and the best known logic G3 due to Gödel; the latter is
deﬁned exactly by the same functions as the former, except that the negation corresponding to the truth value 1 is 0. As a
consequence, whereas G ′3 accepts the principle of the excluded middle, G3 does not.
An axiomatization for G ′3 is presented in [21]. In particular all of the axioms of Cw are included in such axiomatization.
Modus Ponens is the only rule of inference.
We will use the notation G ′3 A, to express the fact that the formula A is a theorem in G ′3; i.e. A can be inferred from
the axioms of G ′3, by using modus ponens.
Positive Logic is deﬁned by the following set of axioms:
Pos 1: A → (B → A)
Pos 2: (A → (B → C)) → ((A → B) → (A → C))
Pos 3: A ∧ B → A
Pos 4: A ∧ B → B
Pos 5: A → (B → (A ∧ B))
Pos 6: A → (A ∨ B)
Pos 7: B → (A ∨ B)
Pos 8: (A → C) → ((B → C) → (A ∨ B → C))
G ′3 is deﬁned by all axioms of positive logic plus the following six axioms:
1: A ∨ ¬A
2: ¬¬A → A
3: (¬A → ¬B) ↔ (¬¬B → ¬¬A)
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5: ¬¬(A ∧ B) ↔ (¬¬A ∧ ¬¬B)
6: ((B ∧ ¬B) ∧ (∼∼ A ∧ ¬A)) → A
In order to simplify notation, we use A ∨ B as an abbreviation for ((A → B) → B) ∧ ((B → A) → A) in the ﬁrst of the
new six axioms, and in the last axiom we use the abbreviation: ∼ A := A → (¬A ∧ ¬¬A).
One of the main results presented in [21], is a soundness and completeness theorem for the G ′3 logic, namely: a formula
is a tautology in the three-valued logic G ′3 if and only if, it is a theorem according to the axiomatization; we can express this
in the notation we have introduced: |G ′3 A if and only if G ′3 A. We will use any of the two terminologies when referring
to such a formula.
Positive logic plus the two axioms: A ∨¬A and ¬¬A → A, deﬁne the Cw logic, the weakest paraconsistent logic deﬁned
by da Costa [10].
We observe that the formula (¬A ∧ A) → B is not a theorem in either of the two logics. This fact indeed makes these
two logics paraconsistent.
The G ′3 logic is strictly stronger than Cw , and both of them are strictly weaker than classical logic. In particular the
formula B → [(¬B ∧ A) → C], where A, B and C are arbitrary formulas, which is a tautology in classical logic, is not always
a tautology in G ′3, as is seen in the particular case when A, B , C take the truth values of 2, 1 and 0 respectively.
As a useful result we also mention that the formula (¬A → A) → A is a tautology in the G ′3 logic for any formula A.
Intuitionistic logic I is deﬁned as positive logic plus the following two axioms: (A → B) → [(A → ¬B) → ¬A] and
¬A → (A → B). These two axioms allow to do proofs by contradiction but in some limited way; other constructions such
as the law of the excluded middle: (A ∨ ¬A), are not valid in intuitionistic logic; however the formula (¬A ∧ A) → B is
valid in this logic. All of these properties are shared with the logic G3 mentioned before; in fact, G3 is stronger than I in
the sense that any theorem in I is also a theorem in G3.
Notice the opposite situation occurring between intuitionistic and G3 logics, and the paraconsistent logics Cw and G ′3
regarding the last two formulas above; as it was mentioned before, the ﬁrst one is valid in Cw and G ′3, but the second one
is not. See van Dalen [37] for a good introduction to intuitionistic logic.
We will use the following notation: | denotes the consequence relation in classical logic, X denotes the inference
relation in any particular logic X . For any two formulas A and B , A ≡X B denotes the fact that A and B are equivalent
in logic X , i.e. A → B and B → A are both theorems or tautologies in logic X , depending on how logic X is deﬁned. Two
programs P and Q are equivalent in logic X , denoted: P ≡X Q , if the conjunction of the rules in P is equivalent, in logic X
to the conjunction of the rules in Q .
As a known fact, we observe that the ﬁrst two axioms of positive logic guarantee the deduction theorem, namely: for
Γ, A, B , where Γ is a set of formulas, and A, B are formulas: Γ, A  B if and only if Γ  A → B .
Finally we mention a couple of facts that will be used later:
First, if two programs are equivalent in the logic G ′3, then when adding common rules to both programs, the new two
programs are also equivalent in G ′3, i.e. if P1 ≡G ′3 P2 then P1 ∪ P ≡G ′3 P2 ∪ P for any other program P .
Second, for a disjunctive program P and an atom a, the next statement holds: P | a if and only if P Cω a, see [22].
This statement is not true if we substitute Cw for G3 or I . The fact that Cw accepts the law of the excluded middle is key
to the equivalence.
3.2. p-stable semantics
From now on we assume that the reader is familiar with the notion of classical minimal model, Lloyd [20].
Here we deﬁne the p-stable semantics for disjunctive programs.
Deﬁnition 1. (See [22].) Let P be a disjunctive program and M be a set of atoms. We deﬁne:
RED(P ,M) = {H ← B+,¬(B− ∩ M) | H ← B+,¬B− ∈ P}
Deﬁnition 2. (See [22].) Let P be a disjunctive program and M be a set of atoms. We say that M is a p-stable model of P
if the conjunction of the atoms in M is a logical consequence in classical logic of RED(P ,M) (denoted as RED(P ,M) | M)
and M is a classical model of P (i.e. a model in classical logic).
Example 3. Let P be the disjunctive program:
{a∨ b ← ¬c, a ← c, b ← ¬c, c ← ¬b}
Let M1 = {b} and M2 = {a, c}. Both sets model (in classical logic) the rules of P .
From the deﬁnition of the RED transformation we ﬁnd
RED(P ,M1) = {a∨ b ←, a ← c, b ←, c ← ¬b}
RED(P ,M2) = {a∨ b ← ¬c, a ← c, b ← ¬c, c ←}
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Hence M1 and M2 are p-stable models for P .
3.3. The X-stable semantics
Given a program P and a set of atoms M ⊆ LP , we call the construct P ∪¬Mc a weak completion of the program P (with
respect to the set of atoms M), where the superscript c, denotes set theoretical complement operator with respect to LP .
Deﬁnition 4. Let P be any theory, X be any logic and M be a set of atoms. M is a X-stable model of P if the next two
conditions hold: X P ∪ ¬Mc → M and M is a classical model of P .
The expression appearing in the ﬁrst condition of this deﬁnition is interpreted as the formula where the antecedent is
the conjunction of all rules in P and all literals in ¬Mc , and the consequent is the conjunction of all the atoms in M . We
will keep using this interpretation in what follows.
Let us discuss the advantage of using paraconsistent logics in terms of this deﬁnition, by looking at the next simple
program: P = {a ← ¬b}. It is clear that the set {a} is a X-stable model for any logic X with modus ponens as an inference
rule. It is also clear that the set {b} also becomes a model when X is taken as classical logic: this is due to the two formulas:
(¬b → a) → (¬a → ¬¬b) and ¬¬b → b which are theorems in classical logic. In the paraconsistent logics presented here,
the formula (¬b → a) → (¬a → ¬¬b) is not a theorem, a fact that prevents {b} from becoming a G ′3-stable model.
3.3.1. The G ′3-stable semantics
Of particular interest to us is the G ′3-stable semantics, which is the result of using the logic G ′3 in the previous deﬁnition.
Example 5. Consider the following logic program:
P = {b ← ¬a,a ← ¬b, p ← ¬a, p ← ¬p}
It is easy to verify that this program has two G ′3-stable models, which are {a, p} and {b, p}.
Example 6. Let us consider the next program with one single rule:
{a ← ¬b}
The set M = {a} is a G ′3-stable model according to the deﬁnition, since the formula: [(¬b → a) ∧ ¬b] → a, is a theorem in
the logic G ′3. M is also a X-stable model if X is taken as classical logic and also a model in the classical sense.
The set {a,b} which is a model in the classical sense, is not a X-stable model for neither of the choices, X = G ′3 or
X = classical logic.
Let us now observe that any G ′3-valuation that makes the two rules ¬b → a and ¬a true, forces the truth value of b to
be the designated value two. However the set M ′ = {b} is not a G ′3-stable model, since the formula [(¬b → a) ∧ ¬a] → b
is not a theorem in the logic G ′3. This last fact is easy to check by using the soundness and completeness result for G ′3
mentioned before, and the fact that the formula [(¬b → a) ∧ ¬a] → b is not a G ′3-tautology.
This observation makes clear that, given a set of formulas Γ and a formula A, such that any G ′3-model of Γ is a G ′3-
model of A, the relation Γ G ′3 A does not necessarily follow.
The next result was ﬁrst proven for normal programs in [26]; more recently it has been extended to disjunctive programs
in [22].
Theorem 7. (See [22].) Let P be a disjunctive program and M be a set of atoms. M is a p-stable model of P iff M is a G ′3-stable model
of P .
Theorem 7 gives a characterization of the p-stable semantics for disjunctive programs in terms of the G ′3 logic. There is
a similar result that characterizes the stable semantics for disjunctive programs in terms of the Gödel G3 logic, Pearce [31].
In [22] the authors also present a simple translation of a disjunctive program D into a normal program N , such that the
p-stable semantics of N corresponds to the stable semantics of D over the common language. In particular, it is not diﬃcult
to see that for normal programs, any stable model is a p-stable model, but the converse does not hold.
As can be seen, G ′3-stable models are deﬁned for propositional logic programs only. However this deﬁnition can be
extended to predicate programs, which allow the use of predicate symbols in the language, but without function symbols
to ensure the ground instance of the program to be ﬁnite. So a term can only be either a variable or a constant symbol.
The ground instance of a predicate program, Ground(P ), is deﬁned in Lifschitz [17] as the program containing all ground
instances of clauses in P . Then M is deﬁned as a G ′3-stable model of a predicate program P if it is a G ′3-stable model for
Ground(P ).
In this paper we deal exclusively with propositional logic programs.
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In this section we discuss the main contributions of the paper, one of them; Theorem 13 provides suﬃcient conditions
for the strong G ′3-stable equivalence of two arbitrary programs, the other one; Theorem 19 deals more speciﬁcally with a
couple of programs of the form P and P ∪ {a ←}.
Deﬁnition 8. We denote by C the class of certain programs i.e. normal, disjunctive, positive, arbitrary, etc. We say that two
programs P1 and P2 in C are G ′3-stable equivalent if they have the same G ′3-stable models. We say that the programs P1
and P2 in C are strongly G ′3-stable equivalent with respect to the class C , if for any other program P ∈ C , P ∪ P1 and P ∪ P2
are G ′3-stable equivalent. We say that the programs P1 and P2 are uniformly G ′3-stable equivalent if for any set of atoms
M , P1 ∪ M and P2 ∪ M are G ′3-stable equivalent.
It is clear that, if two programs P and Q belong to the class C where C is a subclass of C ′ , and they are strongly
G ′3-stable equivalent with respect to the class C ′ , then they are strongly G ′3-stable equivalent with respect to the class C .
Proposition 9. Let P1 and P2 be programs in the same class C . If P1 and P2 are strongly G ′3-stable equivalent with respect to the class
C then they are uniformly G ′3-stable equivalent. If P1 and P2 are uniformly G ′3-stable equivalent then they are G ′3-stable equivalent.
Proof. The proof of this statement is a direct consequence of the deﬁnitions. 
The converses of the two implications in the previous statement are not true: First let us observe that two programs
that are G ′3-stable equivalent need not to be uniformly G ′3-stable equivalent as the following two examples show:
Example 10.
P1 = {a ← ¬b}, P2 = {a ←}
Both programs have as unique G ′3-stable model the set: {a}.
If we take
P = {b ←}
then we see that P ∪ P1 has only one G ′3-stable model, namely: {b}, whereas P ∪ P2 has as its unique G ′3-stable model the
set {a,b}.
As a second example we take two programs in the class of disjunctive programs:
Example 11.
P1 = {a∨ c ← ¬b}, P2 = {a∨ c ←}
These programs do not have G ′3-stable models; but if we add the fact b ←, to both of them, we get a program for which
the set {b} is a G ′3-stable model and a program that does not have G ′3-stable models.
Remark. The paraconsistent logic G ′3 has as theorems all of the theorems of positive logic, therefore the formula[A → (A ∨ B)] is a theorem in G ′3. From this fact we can see that the program (A ∨ B) can not take {A} or {B} as a
G ′3-stable model. The argument is as follows: If we assume {B} to be a model, then by the deﬁnition of G ′3-stable model,
the formula {[(A∨ B)∧¬A] → B} would be a theorem in G ′3. This formula together with the formula [A → (A∨ B)] and the
cut property lead to the formula [(A ∧ ¬A) → B]. But this formula is not a theorem in any paraconsistent logic. Thus, the
paraconsistency of the G ′3 logic and the fact that it is an extension of the positive logic impose restrictions on the semantics
for disjunctive programs. A slight modiﬁcation in the deﬁnition of the p-stable semantics of disjunctive programs offers an
alternative that allows models to programs like {A ∨ B}. The substitution of the rule (A ∨ B) by the two rules (A ← ¬B),
(B ← ¬A) gives a new program with two p-stable models, {A} and {B}. We do not consider this modiﬁcation in this paper.
Now we give an example of two programs that are uniformly G ′3-stable equivalent but are not strongly G ′3-stable equiv-
alent:
Example 12.
P1 = {a ← b ∧ ¬b}, P2 = {b ← a∧ ¬a}
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program P , consisting solely of the clause b ← ¬a, then {a} is a p-stable model of P1 ∪ P , but not a p-stable model of
P2 ∪ P . Hence P1 and P2 are not strongly G ′3-stable equivalent.
The next result presents a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the G ′3-stable equivalence of two arbitrary programs.
Theorem 13. Let P1 and P2 be arbitrary programs, if P1 ≡G ′3 P2 (i.e. they are equivalent in the G ′3 logic), then they are strongly
G ′3-stable equivalent with respect to the class of arbitrary programs.
Proof. Let P be another arbitrary program, let M be a G ′3-stable model of P1 ∪ P , this means that M is a classical model of
P1 ∪ P and also that P1 ∪ P ∪ ¬Mc G ′3 M . Since P1 ≡G ′3 P2, it follows as noted in Section 2.1, that P1 ∪ P ≡G ′3 P2 ∪ P and
then we conclude that M is a classical model of P2 ∪ P and that P2 ∪ P ∪ ¬Mc G ′3 M as desired.
A symmetric argument shows that a G ′3-stable model of P2 ∪ P is also a G ′3-stable model of P1 ∪ P . 
The converse of the proposition is not true: ﬁrst we consider a counterexample for arbitrary programs and then one in
the class of normal programs.
Example 14. Let P1 and P2 be deﬁned as follows:
P1 = {a ←, ¬a ←, b ←}, P2 = {b ←, ¬b ←, a ←}
P1 and P2 are strongly G ′3-stable equivalent, since for any other arbitrary program P , P1 ∪ P and P2 ∪ P do not have
G ′3-stable models due to the presence of contradictory literals as heads in each of the programs. It is easy to see that P1
and P2 are not equivalent in the G ′3 logic.
The next example illustrates the fact that two programs can be strongly G ′3-stable equivalent with respect to the class of
normal programs without being equivalent in the G ′3 logic.
Example 15. Let P1 and P2 be the following normal programs:
P1 = {c ← ∧a j ∧ ¬b, b ←}, P2 = {b ←}
Let us see ﬁrst that P1 and P2 are not equivalent in the G ′3-logic: in order to do this, it is enough to show that the rule
in P2 is not strong enough in the G ′3-logic to imply the ﬁrst rule in P1. In other words, b → [(∧a j ∧ ¬b) → c] is not a G ′3
tautology. This can be seen by working out a truth table.
Next, we proceed to check that the two programs are strongly G ′3-stable equivalent with respect to the class of normal
programs. Let P be another normal program, we want to see that P1 ∪ P and P2 ∪ P have the same p-stable models (by
Theorem 7).
Let M be a p-stable model of P1 ∪ P . In particular it must be the case that b ∈ M . By deﬁnition, M is a classical model
of P1 ∪ P and also RED(P1 ∪ P ,M) | M , this last condition is equivalent to: P1 ∪ RED(P ,M) | M .
Now, from the fact that the expression: b → [(¬b∧ A) → C] is a tautology in classical logic for any formulas A and C , it
follows that P2 | P1 i.e. P2 | r for every rule r ∈ P1. It is also clear that P1 | P2.
Therefore M is a classical model of P2 ∪ P , and also RED(P2 ∪ P ,M) | M since RED(P2 ∪ P ,M) = P2 ∪ RED(P ,M). The
rest of the proof consists of a similar argument.
Observation. Notice that it is important to have the program P in the class of normal programs. If we consider an arbitrary
program P , then P1 ∪ P and P2 ∪ P do not necessarily have the same G ′3-stable models. To see this, let us choose P to be
the program consisting of one rule: d ← (c ← (∧a j ∧ ¬b)). Then it is easy to see from Deﬁnition 4 that the set {b,d} is a
G ′3-stable model for P1 ∪ P , but not for P2 ∪ P .
Although strong G ′3-stable equivalence is not enough to guarantee equivalence in the G ′3 logic, it does guarantee equiva-
lence in classical logic:
Proposition 16. Let P1 and P2 be two arbitrary programs that are uniformly G ′3-stable equivalent, then they are equivalent in classical
logic: P1 ≡CL P2 .
Proof. We argue by contradiction: let us assume that P1 and P2 are not equivalent in classical logic. Then, there exists
a classical interpretation I such that I(P1) = 1, I(P2) = 0. Let M = {a | I(a) = 1}, the set of all the atoms in LP1∪P2 for
which the interpretation I takes the value 1. Then, according to Deﬁnition 4, M is a G ′3-stable model of P1 ∪ M but not of
P2 ∪ M . 
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logic. Our next proposition gives conditions under which two disjunctive programs of the form P , P ∪ {a ←}, where a is an
atom, are strongly G ′3-stable equivalent. We need a couple of lemmas to support the proof.
Lemma 17. Let P be a disjunctive program and M be a classical model of P , then M is a G ′3-stable model of P ∪ M.
Proof. By hypothesis M is a classical model for P , then it is also a classical model for P ∪ M . Since RED(P ∪ M,M) =
RED(P ,M) ∪ M , it is clear that RED(P ∪ M,M) | M . Hence M is a G ′3-stable model of P ∪ M . 
The second lemma was already mentioned in Section 2.1 [22].
Lemma 18. For a disjunctive program P , and an atom a, we have that P | a if and only if P Cω a.
Theorem 19. Let P be a disjunctive program and a be an atom, then P | a if and only if P and P ∪ {a ←} are strongly G ′3-stable
equivalent with respect to the class of arbitrary programs, if and only if P and P ∪ {a ←} are uniformly G ′3-stable equivalent.
Proof. From P | a, it follows by Lemma 18 that P Cω a, and from the fact that the G ′3-logic is stronger than the Cω-logic,
it follows that P G ′3 a. Hence we conclude that P ≡G ′3 P ∪ {a ←}. This in turn implies by Theorem 13 that P and P ∪ {a ←}
are strongly G ′3-stable equivalent with respect to the class of arbitrary programs, and in particular uniformly G ′3-stable
equivalent.
Conversely, let us assume now that the two programs are uniformly G ′3-stable equivalent. Assume for a moment that
P | a: then there exists a classical model of P , say M such that M(a) = 0. By Lemma 17, M is a G ′3-stable model of P ∪ M ,
but M is not a G ′3-stable model of P ∪ {a ←} ∪ M . It means that P and P ∪ {a ←} are not uniformly G ′3-stable equivalent,
but this is a contradiction and the proof is complete. 
Deﬁnition 20. Given a disjunctive program P , we deﬁne
to-pos(P ) =
{(∨
i
ai ∨
∨
j
c j
)
←
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bl
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ai ←
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¬c j
)
∈ P
}
The transformation just moves negative literals from the body of every clause to their heads by changing them to
positive.
Example 21. We present a program P and its transformed to-pos(P ):
P = {a1 ∨ a2 ← b ∧ ¬c, a2 ← b ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬d}
to-pos(P ) = {a1 ∨ a2 ∨ c ← b, a2 ∨ c ∨ d ← b}
Corollary 22. Let P be a disjunctive program and a be an atom. Then to-pos(P ) Cω a if and only if P and P ∪ {a ←} are strongly
G ′3-stable equivalent, if and only if P and P ∪ {a ←} are uniformly G ′3-stable equivalent.
Proof. Follows from the fact that to-pos(P ) and P are equivalent in classical logic, then by using Lemma 18 the result is
simply a restatement of Theorem 19. 
Deﬁnition 23. Given a disjunctive program P , Pos(P ) is the program obtained from P after deleting all the rules containing
negative atoms.
In [24] it is shown that, for a disjunctive program P and an atom a, P is strongly equivalent to P ∪ {a ←} under the
stable semantics if and only if Pos(P ) I a (here the I denotes Intuitionism). In the case of the G ′3-semantics the equivalence
does not hold. From Theorem 19 it follows that if Pos(P ) I a then P and P ∪ {a ←} are strongly G ′3-stable equivalent. The
next examples show that the converse is not true.
Example 24. Let P1 be: {a ← ¬a} and let P2 be: P1 ∪ {a ←}.
Since (¬a → a) → a is a G ′3-tautology, it follows that P1 ≡G ′3 P2, which implies strong G ′3-stable equivalence, however
Pos(P1) = ∅ and from the empty set no atom can be derived.
Example 25. Let P3 and P4 be the following normal programs:
P3 = {a ← b, a ← ¬b, b ← a}, P4 = {a ←, a ← b, a ← ¬b, b ← a}
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implied by the rules of Pos(P3).
5. Program transformations
In this section we present some transformations for disjunctive programs that modify a program into another, generally,
shorter program. The idea is that some program transformations may help to reduce the size of a program and keep at
least the same p-stable semantics. We keep in mind that for disjunctive programs the G ′3-stable semantics and the p-stable
semantics are the same. Some of these transformations are simple, and the transformed program is strongly G ′3-stable
equivalent to the original program. Our main results here are that the General Principle of Partial Evaluation does not
preserve G ′3-stable equivalence, that the Loop transformation does preserve G ′3-stable equivalence, although P and Loop(P )
are not strongly G ′3-stable equivalent, and that Classical Inference preserves strong G ′3-stable equivalence. Some of the
transformations were ﬁrst presented by Brass and Dix [5] for the stable semantics, and similar results also in the context of
the stable semantics, have been presented in [24]. Related work can be seen in [6,14,15,19].
To help the reader to understand the transformations, we will apply each of them to a particular program ρ deﬁned
below, and write the transformed program after each deﬁnition.
ρ = {a∨ b ← b ∧ c ∧ e ∧ ¬d, c ∨ d ← ¬e, b ← d ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬e, d ←}
Deﬁnition 26. The transformation RD+r replaces a rule r : A ← B+ ∧ ¬B− by A ← (B+ ∧ ¬(B− ∩ Head(P ))).
Applying this transformation to our program ρ and choosing r as the third clause we obtain:
RD+r (ρ) = {a∨ b ← b ∧ c ∧ e ∧ ¬d, c ∨ d ← ¬e, b ← d ∧ ¬c, d ←}
Proposition 27. For a disjunctive program P and a rule r ∈ P , P and RD+r (P ) are equivalent under the G ′3-stable semantics.
Proof. First, we observe that any G ′3-stable model M of P (or RD
+
r (P )), is contained in Head(P ). This follows from the
condition RED(P ,M) | M , in Deﬁnition 2.
If a set M ⊆ Head(P ) models P , then in particular M models the rule r, and from the observation above, it follows that
M models the rule A ← (B+ ∧ ¬(B− ∩ Head(P ))). Hence M models RD+r (P ).
Conversely, if M models RD+r (P ), then in particular it models the rule A ← (B+ ∧¬(B− ∩Head(P ))), and it easily follows
that M models the rule r. Therefore M models P .
Now we show that if M ⊆ Head(P ) is a classical model of P (or RD+r (P )), then RED(P ,M) | M if and only if
RED(RD+r (P ),M) | M . But the two programs are the same, since the two rules: A ← B+ ∧ ¬(B− ∩ M) and A ←
(B+ ∧ ¬(B− ∩ Head(P ) ∩ M)) are the same by the observation above. 
The transformation RD+r does not preserve strong G ′3-stable equivalence, as one can see by considering the programs
P = {a ← b∧¬c, b ←} and RD+(P ) = {a ← b, b ←}. If we add the clause: c ← b to each of the two programs, the resulting
programs do not have the same G ′3-stable models.
Deﬁnition 28. The transformation RD−r deletes a rule r: A ← B+ ∧ ¬B− if there is another rule A′ ←, such that A′ ⊆ B− .
Applying this transformation to our program ρ and choosing r as the ﬁrst clause we obtain:
RD−r (ρ) = {c ∨ d ← ¬e, b ← d ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬e, d ←}
Proposition 29. For a normal program P and a rule r ∈ P , P and RD−r (P ) are strongly G ′3-equivalent with respect to the class of
normal programs.
Proof. This follows from the fact that, under the hypothesis {a′} ⊆ B− , the formula a′ → (B+ ∧ ¬B− → a) is a tautology in
classical logic, for then one can derive all of the rules of P from those in RD−r (P ) and vice-versa; also, by the same reason,
for a set M that models both P and RD−r (P ), one can derive all of the rules of RED(P ,M) from those in RED(RD−r (P ),M)
and vice-versa. Then it follows that both programs have the same p-stable models. The same argument shows the strong
p-stable equivalence with respect to the class of normal programs, of the two programs. 
The transformation RD−r does not preserve p-stable equivalence for disjunctive programs, as the following example
shows:
P = {a1 ∨ a2 ←, a1 ← ¬a1 ∧ ¬a2}
RD−r (P ) = {a1 ∨ a2 ←}
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Deﬁnition 30. The transformation Subr deletes a rule r : A ← B+ ∧ ¬B− if there is another rule A′ ← B ′+ ∧ ¬B ′− such that
A′ ⊆ A, B ′+ ⊆ B+ and B ′− ⊆ B− .
Applying this transformation to our program ρ and choosing r as the second rule we obtain:
Subr(ρ) = {a∨ b ← b ∧ c ∧ e ∧ ¬d, b ← d ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬e, d ←}
Proposition 31. For a disjunctive program P and a rule r ∈ P , P and Subr(P ) are strongly G ′3-equivalent with respect to the class of
disjunctive programs.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 13 and the fact that P ≡G ′3 Subr(P ), which in turn follows from the next three implica-
tions, two of which are G ′3 tautologies:(
B+ ∧ ¬B−)→ (B ′+ ∧ ¬B ′−), (B ′+ ∧ ¬B ′−)→ A′ and A′ → A 
Deﬁnition 32. The transformation Tautr deletes a rule r : A ← B+ ∧ ¬B− if A ∩ B+ = ∅.
Applying this transformation to our program ρ and choosing r as the ﬁrst rule we obtain:
Tautr(ρ) = {c ∨ d ← ¬e, b ← d ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬e, d ←}
Proposition 33. For a disjunctive program P and a rule r ∈ P , P and Tautr(P ) are strongly G ′3-equivalent with respect to the class of
disjunctive programs.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 13 and the fact that a rule: A ← B+ ∧ ¬B− for which A ∩ B+ = ∅ is a tautology in the
G ′3 logic, and so P ≡G ′3 Tautr(P ). 
Deﬁnition 34. If P contains the clause a ←, and there is also a clause r : A ← B+ ∧ ¬B− such that a ∈ B+ , then the
transformation Dsuca,r replaces it by the rule: A ← (B+ − {a}) ∧ ¬B− .
Applying this transformation to our program ρ and choosing r as the third rule we obtain:
Dsucr(ρ) = {a∨ b ← b ∧ c ∧ e ∧ ¬d, c ∨ d ← ¬e, b ← ¬c ∧ ¬e, d ←}
It is not diﬃcult to see, with the help of the deduction theorem and Theorem 13, that the transformation Dsuc preserves
strong G ′3-stable equivalence.
Deﬁnition 35. The transformation Failure deletes a rule rb : A ← B+ ∧ ¬B− that contains the atom b, from the program P ,
whenever b ∈ B+ ∩ (Head(P ))c .
Applying this transformation to our program ρ and choosing r as the ﬁrst rule we obtain:
Failurer(ρ) = {c ∨ d ← ¬e, b ← d ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬e, d ←}
Proposition 36. The transformation Failure preserves G ′3-stable equivalence for disjunctive programs.
Proof. For any set M ⊆ Head(P ), it is easy to see that M models P in classical logic if and only if M models P − {rb} in
classical logic. We need to see that for such a M , RED(P ,M) | M if and only if RED(P − {rb},M) | M .
It is enough to show that if RED(P ,M) | M , then RED(P−{rb}b,M) | M where {rb}b = {r = A ← B+∧¬B− ∈ P | b ∈ B+}.
From the fact that ¬b → rb is a tautology in classical logic for any of the rules rb , it follows that RED(P −{rb}b,M)∪¬b |
RED(P ,M), and since RED(P ,M) | M , then RED(P − {rb}b,M) ∪ ¬b | M .
Now, by the way b was chosen, it is not in the language of RED(P − {rb}b,M), it does not belong to M either, and {¬b}
is consistent as a set of rules. Hence RED(P − {rb}b,M) | M . 
Failure does not preserve strong G ′3-stable equivalence as the following example shows:
Example 37. Let P1 and its transformed program P2 according to Failure be:
P1 = {b ←, a ← b, d ← c}, P2 = {b ←, a ← b}
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and to P2 the rule: c ←.
Deﬁnition 38. The transformation Contra deletes a rule r : A ← B+ ∧ ¬B− if there is an atom b ∈ B+ ∩ B− .
The next example shows that Contra does not preserve G ′3-stable equivalence:
Example 39. Let P be the following normal program:
P = {b ← ¬a, a ← b ∧ ¬b}
then
Contra(P ) = {b ← ¬a}
The p-stable models of P are {a} and {b}, whereas the only p-stable model of Contra(P ) is {b}.
The next transformation is traditionally called supra-classicality, it does not preserve equivalence in the case of the stable
semantics. In the case of the p-stable semantics we call it Classical Inference (CI).
Deﬁnition 40. The transformation CI adds a rule r :a ← to the program P , if the atom a is classical logical consequence of
the rules of P (i.e. P | a).
Proposition 41. Classical inference preserves strong G ′3 equivalence.
This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 19.
Deﬁnition 42 (Generalized Principle of Partial Evaluation (GPPE)). (See [4].) If P contains a clause A ← B+ ∧ ¬B− such that
B+ = ∅, and B+ contain a distinguished atom a, with a /∈ (A ∩ B+), then this transformation replaces such clause by the
following n clauses (i = 1, . . . ,n):
A ∪ (Ai \ {a})← (B+ \ {a})∪ B+i ∧ ¬(B− ∪ B−i )
where Ai ← B+i ∧ ¬B−i are all the clauses with a ∈ Ai . If no such clauses exist, we simply delete the former clause. If the
transformation cannot be applied then GPPEa behaves as the identity function over A ← B+ ∧ ¬B− .
The GPPE transformation does not preserve G ′3-stable equivalence as the following counter-example shows. Let P1 be:
P1 = {a ← ¬b, a ← b, b ← a}
Observe that P1 has exactly one G ′3-stable model, namely {a,b}. After applying GPPEb we obtain the program P2:
{a ← ¬b, a ← a, b ← a}
P2 has exactly one G ′3-stable model, namely {b}. Hence, P1 and P2 are not G ′3-stable equivalent. On the other hand, it is
well known that GPPE preserves stable equivalence.
For the next transformation presented, we use the fact that a deﬁnite program has always a minimal model which is
unique, Lloyd [20].
Deﬁnition 43 (Loop transformation). Let P be a normal program and let P∗ be the deﬁnite program obtained from P by
deleting all negated atoms in the bodies of the rules of P . Let AP be the minimal model of P∗ . We deﬁne
Loop(P ) = {a ← β+ ∧ ¬β− ∈ P | β+ ⊆ AP}
Example 44. Let P be the following normal program:
P = {e ←, a ← e ∧ ¬b, b ← ¬a, c ← d, d ← c}
Then P∗ is the deﬁnite program:
P∗ = {e ←, a ← e, b ←, c ← d, d ← c}
The minimal model of P∗ is AP :
AP = {a, e,b}
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UP = {c,d}
We will show that any p-stable model of P is a subset of AP : in this particular example the p-stable models: {e,a}, {e,b},
are both contained in AP . Equivalently, any element of UP is false in any p-stable model.
Now, according to our deﬁnition of the Loop transformation:
Loop(P ) = {e ←, a ← e ∧ ¬b, b ← ¬a}
It turns out that the p-stable models of Loop(P ) are the same as those of P .
Now we state a lemma we need in order to establish the main result concerning the Loop transformation.
Lemma 45. Let P be a normal program and let P ∗ be the deﬁnite program obtained from P by deleting all negated atoms in its rules;
Let AP be the minimal model of P∗ . Then, for any p-stable model M of P , the relation M ⊆ AP holds.
Proof. Let AP be the minimal model of P∗ , let a ← β+ ∧ ¬(β− ∩ M) be any rule in RED(P ,M). Then, if its body is true
in AP so is β+ , and since the rule a ← β+ appears in P∗ , we conclude that a ∈ AP , and so AP models all of the rules in
RED(P ,M). Now, from the fact that RED(P ,M) | M , it follows that AP | M . We conclude that M ⊆ AP . 
Proposition 46. Let P be a normal program, then P and Loop(P ) have the same p-stable models.
Proof. Let UP be AcP , the set of atoms that do not belong to AP , and let us write P as Loop(P ) ∪ L where L consists of
those rules in P whose positive atoms in their bodies contain at least one element in UP , according to the deﬁnition of the
transformation Loop.
Let us assume that M is a p-stable model of P , i.e. M is a classical model for P and RED(P ,M) | M . We need to prove
that M is a classical model of Loop(P ) and also that RED(Loop(P ),M) | M .
M is clearly a classical model of Loop(P ), and by rewriting the formula: RED(P ,M) | M , as RED(Loop(P ),M) ∪
RED(L,M) | M , we conclude by monotony that RED(Loop(P ),M) ∪ RED(L,M) ∪ ¬UP | M . Now, we observe that from
¬UP we can recover all rules in RED(L,M); i.e. ¬UP | RED(L,M), since ¬u → [(u ∧ β+ ∧ ¬(β− ∩ M)) → a] is a tautology
in classical logic. From this we conclude that RED(Loop(P ),M) ∪ ¬UP | M .
Given a rule in RED(Loop(P ),M): a ← β+ ∧ ¬(β− ∩ M), we know that β+ ⊂ AP and since AP is the minimal model of
P∗ and the rule a ← β+ ∈ P∗ , we conclude that a ∈ AP . Therefore UP does not intersect the language of RED(Loop(P ),M);
also ¬UP is a consistent set of literals. From these facts we conclude that RED(Loop(P ),M) | M .
This proves that M is a p-stable model of Loop(P ).
In order to prove the converse, let M be a p-stable model of Loop(P ), then, according to Lemma 45, M ⊆ ALoop(P ) , where
ALoop(P ) is the minimal model of (Loop(P ))∗ , the deﬁnite program resulting from deleting all negated atoms from Loop(P ).
It is easy to see that AP is a classical model for (Loop(P ))∗ , therefore ALoop(P ) ⊆ AP . We conclude that M ⊂ AP . From this it
follows that M models L, hence M models P .
Finally, the relation RED(P ,M) | M follows from RED(Loop(P ),M) | M and monotony. 
Observation. In general, the Programs P and Loop(P ) are not uniformly G ′3-equivalent.
As a counterexample let P be the same program as above:
P = {e ←, a ← e ∧ ¬b, b ← ¬a, c ← d, d ← c}
Then, it is easy to see that P ∪ {c ←} and Loop(P ) ∪ {c ←} do not have the same p-stable models.
The next property we explore, is called Cautious Monotonicity (CM): one would expect that given a program P , and an
atom q in the language of P , with the property that q belongs to every p-stable model of P , then P and P ∪ {q ←} would
have the same p-stable models. It has been shown in Baral [2], that this proposition does not hold for stable models. The
next example with a normal program shows that the property does not hold in the case of the p-stable semantics either:
Example 47. Let P be the normal program: {a ← ¬b′, b ← ¬a′, q ← ¬a′, q ← ¬q′,a′ ← a, b′ ← b, q′ ← q,
u ← a′ ∧ ¬a, u ← b′ ∧ ¬b, u ← q′ ∧ ¬q, x← ¬y ∧ u, y ← ¬z ∧ u, z ← ¬x∧ u}.
We can see that the set {b,q,b′,q′} is a p-stable model of P , and in fact, the two rules: q ← ¬q′ and q′ ← q, guarantee
that the atom q′ belongs to any p-stable model of P . Now, if we assume that M is any p-stable model for which q /∈ M ,
then from the rule u ← q′ ∧ ¬q, it follows that u ∈ M . This fact along with the last three rules of the program lead to
inconsistencies, hence q must belong to any p-stable model. However, the set: {a,q,a′,q′} is not a p-stable model of P even
though it is a p-stable model of the program P ∪ {q ←}.
The next table includes a list of the transformations presented in the paper, and indicates the kind of equivalence
preserved by each of them. Pascucci and Fernandez [30] offer a survey of transformations for normal programs in the
context of the p-stable semantics.
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The Loop transformation was deﬁned only for normal programs. The RD− transformation does
preserve strong p-stable equivalence for normal programs.
Transformation name p-stable equivalence strong p-stable equivalence
RD+ yes no
RD− yes no
Sub yes yes
Taut yes yes
Dsuc yes yes
Failure yes no
Contra no no
CI yes yes
GPPE no no
Loop yes no
CM no no
6. Related work and conclusions
The results presented in this paper generalize to the G ′3-stable semantics, and in particular, to the p-stable semantics,
some results dealing with equivalence and strong equivalence under the stable semantics presented in [24]. The results
allow to substitute strongly equivalent programs or to add known facts to programs in order to simplify them and to make
easier the computation of G ′3-stable and in particular p-stable models.
There are some differences in the behavior of the two semantics with respect to some of the transformations. For
example the Contra and GPPE transformations do not preserve strong p-stable equivalence as shown in Section 5, whereas
they do preserve strong stable equivalence [24]. On the other hand the CI transformation (Classical Inference) preserves
strong p-stable equivalence (Proposition 41), but does not preserve stable equivalence as shown by the program {b ← ¬b}.
It is also interesting to point out the existence of some other semantics that share some properties with the p-stable
semantics. Pereira and Pinto [33] present the revised stable semantics for normal programs. Among the properties of this
semantics, let us mention that the program p ← ¬p has a revised stable model, that any stable model is a revised stable
model, and that the transformation called Classical Inference preserves strong revised stable models. However the program
{a ← ¬b, b ← ¬c, c ← ¬a}, which does not have any p-stable model, has three revised models which agree with the
minimal classical models.
Another semantics that shares common features with the p-stable semantics is presented in Schlipf [35]. It is called
stable-by-case semantics.
One of the questions to be explored in future work is whether for two consistent arbitrary theories, equivalence in the
G ′3 logic is the same as strong G ′3-stable equivalence. Also we are considering to study the theory and transformations in
the context of more general programs.
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